NATS JWT Operator Mode

Last verified: 2026-02-14

Overview

NATS uses JWT operator mode for authentication and authorization. This replaces single-token auth with a cryptographic trust hierarchy where the NATS server verifies user JWTs against pre-loaded account JWTs — no round-trips to an external auth service. Why JWT operator mode:

Per-node cryptographic identity (each ops-agent has its own NKey)
Scoped permissions per account (agents can only publish metrics, not consume)
Cross-account stream isolation (agent metrics flow to control plane via explicit export/import)
No shared secrets — compromising one node’s credentials doesn’t affect others

Trust Hierarchy

Operator (root of trust)
├── AGENT Account (ops-agents)
│   └── User JWTs (one per node, signed by AGENT signing key)
├── CONTROL_PLANE Account (internal services)
│   └── User JWTs (one per service instance, self-signed at startup)
└── SYS Account (NATS system monitoring)

Verification flow: The NATS server holds account JWTs in memory (resolver_preload). When a client connects with a user JWT, the server:

Extracts IssuerAccount from the user JWT
Finds the matching account JWT in the preload
Verifies the user JWT signature against the account’s signing key
Applies permissions from the user JWT claims

No external resolver or HTTP call required.

Account Architecture

AGENT Account

Purpose: Ops-agents on node VMs connect under this account.

Property	Value
Name	`AGENT`
Pub permissions	`metrics.>`
Sub permissions	`_INBOX.>`
JetStream	None (no disk/memory allocation)
Exports	`metrics.>` (Stream type) — consumed by CONTROL_PLANE
User JWT TTL	14 days

Agents can only publish metrics and subscribe to reply inboxes. They cannot consume streams, subscribe to other subjects, or access JetStream directly.

CONTROL_PLANE Account

Purpose: Internal services (agent-gateway, health-evaluator, API server, payment service) connect under this account.

Property	Value
Name	`CONTROL_PLANE`
Pub permissions	`>` (full)
Sub permissions	`>` (full)
JetStream	Unlimited disk/memory, 10 streams, 50 consumers
Imports	`agent-metrics` from AGENT account (`metrics.>`)
User JWT TTL	None (no expiry for internal services)

The CONTROL_PLANE account owns the HOODCLOUD_METRICS JetStream stream. Metrics published by agents in the AGENT account flow into this stream via the cross-account import. NATS clustering: In production, NATS runs as a 3-node cluster with R=3 (3 replicas) for all JetStream streams (HOODCLOUD_EVENTS, HOODCLOUD_METRICS, PAYMENTS). Replicas are configurable via stream config (dev=1, prod=3). Raft consensus ensures no message loss on single-node failure.

SYS Account

Purpose: NATS system monitoring ($SYS subject hierarchy).

Property	Value
Name	`SYS`
Designated as	`system_account` in nats.conf

Standard NATS system account for server monitoring and diagnostics.

Agent Credential Flow

First Boot: NKey Generation

When the ops-agent starts for the first time, it generates an Ed25519 NKey pair:

nkeys.CreateUser() → user keypair
Write seed to {dataDir}/nats-user.seed (mode 0600)
On subsequent boots: load seed from file

Package: internal/opsagent/natscreds/manager.go The seed file persists across restarts. The public key (prefix U) identifies this agent to NATS.

JWT Request via gRPC

The agent requests a signed user JWT from the agent-gateway:

Agent                          Agent-Gateway
  |                                |
  |-- GetNATSCredentials --------->|
  |   (node_id, node_token,       |
  |    nats_public_key)            |
  |                                |-- Validate node_token
  |                                |-- Validate nats_public_key (IsValidPublicUserKey)
  |                                |-- Sign user JWT with AGENT signing key
  |                                |   (IssuerAccount: AGENT pub key)
  |                                |   (Pub.Allow: "metrics.>")
  |                                |   (Sub.Allow: "_INBOX.>")
  |                                |   (Expires: now + 14 days)
  |<-- (nats_url, user_jwt, ------|
  |     expires_at, account)       |
  |                                |
  |-- nats.Connect(nats_url) ----->| NATS Server
  |   UserJWT callback: return jwt |   verifies JWT against
  |   Sign callback: sign nonce    |   AGENT account JWT
  |<-- Connected ------------------|

Proto: proto/agent.proto — GetNATSCredentialsRequest (fields: node_id, node_token, nats_public_key), GetNATSCredentialsResponse (fields: nats_url, user_jwt, account, expires_at) Signer: internal/natsjwt/signer.go — Signer.SignUserJWT(agentPubKey, nodeID) returns (jwt, expiry, error)

NATS Connection

The agent connects using the nats.UserJWT callback pattern:

nats.UserJWT(
    manager.UserJWTHandler(),  // returns current JWT string
    manager.SignHandler(),     // signs server nonce with NKey
)

This pattern supports automatic reconnection — NATS calls the JWT handler on every connect/reconnect, so the agent always presents the latest JWT. Package: internal/opsagent/natscreds/manager.go — UserJWTHandler(), SignHandler()

Credential Persistence

After receiving a JWT, the agent writes a combined creds file:

jwt.FormatUserConfig(userJWT, seed) → {dataDir}/nats-user.creds

On restart, the agent loads the existing creds file via jwt.ParseDecoratedJWT() and extracts the expiry from the JWT claims. If the JWT is still valid, it connects immediately without requesting a new one.

Proactive Renewal

A background goroutine checks hourly whether the JWT needs renewal:

Renewal trigger: remaining lifetime < 20% of 14-day TTL (~2.8 days)
Check interval: 1 hour
Renewal action: call GetNATSCredentials RPC with current NKey public key

Package: cmd/ops-agent/main.go — runJWTRenewal() goroutine If the control plane is unreachable during renewal, the agent retries every hour. The 2.8-day renewal window provides substantial buffer for transient outages.

JWT Expiry Behavior

When a JWT expires, the NATS server disconnects the client. The nats.UserJWT callback pattern handles this: on reconnect, the JWT handler returns the (now-renewed) JWT. If renewal hasn’t happened yet, the connection fails and retries according to MaxReconnects: -1 (unlimited).

Bootstrap Order

register with control plane → fetch DEK → init NKey manager →
fetch JWT (if needed) → init observation runner (with UserJWT callbacks) →
start renewal goroutine

Shutdown

manager.Close() calls userKP.Wipe() to zero the NKey from memory.

Internal Service Auth

Internal services (agent-gateway, health-evaluator, API server) authenticate to NATS using self-signed ephemeral JWTs under the CONTROL_PLANE account. Package: internal/natsjwt/internal.go — CreateInternalCredentials(signingKeyPEM, accountPubKey)

1. nkeys.CreateUser() → ephemeral user keypair (not persisted)
2. jwt.NewUserClaims(userPub)
   - IssuerAccount: CONTROL_PLANE account pub key
   - Pub.Allow: ">" (full)
   - Sub.Allow: ">" (full)
   - Expires: 0 (no expiry)
3. Encode with CONTROL_PLANE signing key
4. Return (userJWT, userKeyPair)

Each service instance generates fresh credentials at startup. No persistence, no renewal. The signing seed comes from Vault (or env var in dev). Connection helper: internal/natsjwt/connect.go — ConnectWithJWT(url, jwt, userKP) and NATSAuthOption(jwt, userKP)

Payment Service

The payment service has its own natsjwt package (payment-service/internal/natsjwt/natsjwt.go) following the same pattern — CreateCredentials() generates an ephemeral user JWT using the CTRL account signing seed.

Infrastructure Setup

nats-jwt-setup Tool

Location: cmd/nats-jwt-setup/main.go One-time setup tool that generates all JWT infrastructure:

go run cmd/nats-jwt-setup/main.go -output-dir infrastructure/docker/nats/jwt

Generates:

Operator keypair + JWT
Operator signing keypair
AGENT account keypair + signing keypair + JWT (with metrics.> export)
CONTROL_PLANE account keypair + signing keypair + JWT (with metrics import, JetStream limits)
SYS account keypair + JWT
nats.conf with resolver_preload
operator.jwt file

Output:

JWT files written to {output-dir}/
nats.conf written to {output-dir}/../nats.conf
Vault storage commands printed to stdout (seeds never written to files)
All seeds zeroed after use

NATS Server Configuration

File: infrastructure/docker/nats/nats.conf

operator: /etc/nats/jwt/operator.jwt
system_account: <SYS_ACCOUNT_PUB>

resolver: MEMORY
resolver_preload: {
    <AGENT_ACCOUNT_PUB>: <AGENT_JWT>
    <CTRL_ACCOUNT_PUB>: <CTRL_JWT>
    <SYS_ACCOUNT_PUB>: <SYS_JWT>
}

tls {
    cert_file: /etc/nats/tls/fullchain.pem
    key_file: /etc/nats/tls/privkey.pem
    timeout: 5
}

MEMORY resolver means account JWTs are embedded in the config. No external resolver needed.

Docker Volumes

nats:
  image: nats:2.10-alpine
  volumes:
    - ./nats/nats.conf:/etc/nats/nats.conf:ro
    - ./nats/jwt:/etc/nats/jwt:ro          # operator.jwt
    - /opt/hoodcloud/nats-tls:/etc/nats/tls:ro  # TLS certificates (Let's Encrypt)
    - nats_data:/data                       # JetStream storage

Vault Secret Structure

All signing seeds are stored in Vault at the application credentials path:

Vault Field	JSON Key	Purpose
Operator signing seed	`nats_operator_signing_seed`	Signs account JWTs (used only by nats-jwt-setup)
AGENT account signing seed	`nats_agent_account_signing_seed`	Signs user JWTs for ops-agents (used by agent-gateway)
CTRL account signing seed	`nats_ctrl_account_signing_seed`	Signs user JWTs for internal services
AGENT account public key	`nats_agent_account_pub`	Embedded in user JWT `IssuerAccount` claim
CTRL account public key	`nats_ctrl_account_pub`	Embedded in user JWT `IssuerAccount` claim

Accessor methods: internal/secrets/credentials.go — NATSOperatorSigningSeed(), NATSAgentAccountSigningSeed(), NATSCtrlAccountSigningSeed(), NATSAgentAccountPub(), NATSCtrlAccountPub() Config integration: internal/vault/client.go — GetAppCredentials() calls appCreds.SetNATSJWTCredentials() when operator seed is present in Vault.

Environment Variables

Variable	Service	Purpose
`NATS_JWT_ENABLED`	agent-gateway, API server, health-evaluator	Enable JWT operator mode
`NATS_JWT_AGENT_ACCOUNT_PUB`	agent-gateway	AGENT account public key for JWT signing
`NATS_JWT_CTRL_ACCOUNT_PUB`	agent-gateway, API server, health-evaluator	CTRL account public key
`NATS_JWT_EXTERNAL_URL`	agent-gateway	Public NATS URL for ops-agents (`tls://...`)
`NATS_AGENT_SIGNING_SEED`	agent-gateway (dev only)	Env fallback for AGENT signing seed
`NATS_CTRL_SIGNING_SEED`	payment-service	CTRL account signing seed
`NATS_CTRL_ACCOUNT_PUB`	payment-service	CTRL account public key

Seeds should come from Vault in production. Environment variable fallbacks exist only for local development.

TLS Configuration

Overview

NATS uses a Let’s Encrypt TLS certificate obtained via certbot with DNS-01 challenge (Cloudflare). All clients — internal services and external ops-agents — trust the certificate via system root CAs. No custom CA distribution is needed. Key properties:

Automatic renewal via certbot (every 60–90 days)
Zero-downtime reload: certbot deploy hook sends SIGHUP to NATS, which reloads TLS config without dropping connections
No manual certificate transfer between servers

Port Layout

Port	Purpose	TLS	Audience
4222	NATS listener	Yes (Let’s Encrypt)	All clients (internal + external)

All connections use tls:// URLs. There is a single TLS-enabled port for both internal Docker services and external ops-agents.

Certificate Files

File	Location	Purpose
`fullchain.pem`	`/opt/hoodcloud/nats-tls/`	Let’s Encrypt certificate chain
`privkey.pem`	`/opt/hoodcloud/nats-tls/`	Private key for the certificate

Certbot writes certificates to /etc/letsencrypt/live/<domain>/. The deploy hook copies them to /opt/hoodcloud/nats-tls/ for NATS to read.

Certificate Issuance and Renewal

Certbot uses the DNS-01 challenge with a Cloudflare API token to prove domain ownership. The token is stored in Vault and retrieved on-demand via a wrapper script — no persistent Cloudflare credentials on disk.

# Issue or renew via the wrapper script (authenticates to Vault via AppRole)
/opt/hoodcloud/scripts/certbot-renew.sh

Cloudflare API token:

Stored in Vault at secret/infra/certbot/cloudflare (key: api_token)
Scoped to Zone:DNS:Edit + Zone:Zone:Read (minimum privilege)
Retrieved at renewal time by the wrapper script via Vault AppRole authentication
Written to a temporary file (mode 0600), deleted after certbot completes

Vault AppRole (certbot-nats):

Policy: read-only on secret/data/infra/certbot/cloudflare
Token TTL: 5 minutes (short-lived, single-use per renewal)
Credentials: RoleID at /opt/hoodcloud/secrets/certbot-role-id, SecretID at /opt/hoodcloud/secrets/certbot-secret-id (both mode 0400, root only)

Renewal: Certbot auto-renews certificates before expiry (systemd timer or cron). The wrapper script handles the full lifecycle: AppRole login, token retrieval, certbot execution, credential cleanup, and Vault token revocation.

Deploy Hook

Location: /opt/hoodcloud/scripts/nats-cert-deploy.sh The deploy hook:

Copies renewed certificates to /opt/hoodcloud/nats-tls/
Sets correct permissions
Sends SIGHUP to the NATS process, triggering a TLS config reload
Logs the renewal via syslog (certbot-nats tag)

NATS reloads TLS configuration on SIGHUP without dropping existing connections. Clients reconnect transparently with the new certificate on their next connection.

Client Trust

All clients use system root CAs to verify the NATS server certificate. Let’s Encrypt’s root CA (ISRG Root X1) is included in all modern OS trust stores. No custom CA file, environment variable, or volume mount is needed on any client.

Usage Matrix

Component	Location	Mount	Env Var	Purpose
NATS server	Control plane	`/etc/nats/tls/fullchain.pem` + `privkey.pem`	—	TLS listener
api-server	Control plane	—	—	System root CAs
agent-gateway	Control plane	—	—	System root CAs
health-evaluator	Control plane	—	—	System root CAs
orchestrator	Control plane	—	—	System root CAs
ops-agent	Node VMs	—	—	System root CAs
payment-service	Payment host	—	—	System root CAs

NATS Server TLS Config

In nats.conf:

tls {
    cert_file: /etc/nats/tls/fullchain.pem
    key_file: /etc/nats/tls/privkey.pem
    timeout: 5
}

The deploy hook copies certificates to /opt/hoodcloud/nats-tls/ on the host. Docker mounts this directory into the NATS container:

volumes:
  - /opt/hoodcloud/nats-tls:/etc/nats/tls:ro

Certificate Monitoring

x509-certificate-exporter scrapes /opt/hoodcloud/nats-tls/fullchain.pem and exposes expiry as a Prometheus metric
Alert rules:
- NATSTLSCertExpiringSoon — warning at 14 days remaining
- NATSTLSCertExpiryCritical — critical at 3 days remaining
Certbot renewal logging: Renewals logged via syslog with the certbot-nats tag

Key Rotation

Account Signing Key Rotation

Account signing keys can be rotated without disrupting existing connections:

Generate new signing keypair
Add new signing key to account JWT claims (accounts support multiple signing keys)
Re-encode account JWT with operator signing key
Update resolver_preload in nats.conf
Reload NATS server (nats-server --signal reload)
Update Vault with new signing seed
Restart agent-gateway to pick up new seed
After all existing JWTs expire (14 days), remove old signing key

Existing user JWTs signed with the old key remain valid until expiry because the account JWT still contains the old signing key’s public half during the transition.

Operator Key Rotation

Operator key rotation requires regenerating all account JWTs and reloading the NATS server config. This is a heavier operation — plan for maintenance.

User JWT Rotation

User JWTs rotate automatically via the renewal mechanism (20% TTL threshold). No manual intervention needed.

Key Packages

Package	Purpose
`internal/natsjwt/signer.go`	`Signer.SignUserJWT()` — signs scoped user JWTs for ops-agents
`internal/natsjwt/internal.go`	`CreateInternalCredentials()` — ephemeral JWTs for internal services
`internal/natsjwt/connect.go`	`ConnectWithJWT()`, `NATSAuthOption()` — NATS connection helpers
`internal/opsagent/natscreds/manager.go`	NKey generation, JWT storage, renewal callbacks
`internal/grpc/server.go`	`GetNATSCredentials` handler — validates agent, signs JWT
`cmd/nats-jwt-setup/main.go`	One-time infrastructure generation tool
`internal/configtypes/configtypes.go`	`NATSJWTConfig` struct
`internal/secrets/credentials.go`	Vault accessor methods for NATS seeds/keys
`payment-service/internal/natsjwt/natsjwt.go`	Payment service JWT credentials

Operational Notes

Lessons from initial JWT operator mode deployment. Follow these to avoid repeat issues on fresh installs.

JetStream Volume Wipe on Mode Switch

Switching from token-based auth to JWT operator mode changes the account hierarchy. Existing JetStream streams created under the old $G (global) account cannot be recovered by the new accounts. Wipe the NATS data volume before starting in JWT mode:

docker compose down
docker volume rm hoodcloud_nats_data
docker compose up -d nats

This only applies during the one-time migration from token auth to JWT mode.

Payment Service Vault Path

The main app reads credentials from secret/hoodcloud/app-credentials. The payment service uses a separate path: secret/payment-service/credentials. When adding NATS JWT seeds to Vault, ensure nats_ctrl_signing_seed is added to both paths if the payment service connects to the same NATS cluster. The nats_ctrl_account_pub (public key) is not a secret — the payment service reads it from the NATS_CTRL_ACCOUNT_PUB environment variable.

Generated Artifacts — Do Not Commit

nats.conf and operator.jwt are generated by cmd/nats-jwt-setup and contain environment-specific account JWTs and public keys. They are gitignored:

infrastructure/docker/nats/nats.conf — in root .gitignore
infrastructure/docker/nats/jwt/* — in jwt/.gitignore

If git pull overwrites server-generated files, regenerate with nats-jwt-setup or restore from the server backup.

TLS Certificates

See TLS Configuration for Let’s Encrypt setup, deploy hook, usage matrix, and certificate monitoring.

nats-jwt-setup Execution Order

Run nats-jwt-setup on the server (secrets stay on the server, never transit network)
Copy the printed Vault commands and apply them to Vault
Restart services to pick up new credentials from Vault
Verify NATS connectivity with nats server check connection

The tool outputs Vault kv put commands to stdout — do not discard this output. Seeds are zeroed in memory after printing and are not written to any file.

Troubleshooting

Agent Cannot Connect to NATS

Check agent has a seed file: ls -la {dataDir}/nats-user.seed
Check agent has a creds file: ls -la {dataDir}/nats-user.creds
Verify the agent-gateway has NATS JWT signing configured: look for "NATS JWT signer initialized" in gateway logs
Verify the NATS server is running in operator mode: nats-server --signal ldm should show account information

JWT Expired / Connection Rejected

Check agent logs for "NATS JWT nearing expiry, renewing" — renewal should trigger at ~11.2 days
If renewal fails, check agent-gateway connectivity
Verify signing seed in Vault matches the account JWT in nats.conf

Cross-Account Metrics Not Flowing

Verify AGENT account JWT has export for metrics.> (Stream type)
Verify CONTROL_PLANE account JWT has matching import
Check JetStream stream exists: nats stream info HOODCLOUD_METRICS

Internal Service Auth Failure

Verify NATS_JWT_ENABLED=true and NATS_JWT_CTRL_ACCOUNT_PUB is set
Verify CTRL signing seed is present in Vault
Check service logs for "NATS JWT auth configured" at startup

Workflows — Metrics Flow — Observation system architecture
Environment Variables — Full env var reference
Vault — Vault setup and secret structure

​Overview

​Trust Hierarchy

​Account Architecture

​AGENT Account

​CONTROL_PLANE Account

​SYS Account

​Agent Credential Flow

​First Boot: NKey Generation

​JWT Request via gRPC

​NATS Connection

​Credential Persistence

​Proactive Renewal

​JWT Expiry Behavior

​Bootstrap Order

​Shutdown

​Internal Service Auth

​Payment Service

​Infrastructure Setup

​nats-jwt-setup Tool

​NATS Server Configuration

​Docker Volumes

​Vault Secret Structure

​Environment Variables

​TLS Configuration

​Overview

​Port Layout

​Certificate Files

​Certificate Issuance and Renewal

​Deploy Hook

​Client Trust

​Usage Matrix

​NATS Server TLS Config

​Certificate Monitoring

​Key Rotation

​Account Signing Key Rotation

​Operator Key Rotation

​User JWT Rotation

​Key Packages

​Operational Notes

​JetStream Volume Wipe on Mode Switch

​Payment Service Vault Path

​Generated Artifacts — Do Not Commit

​TLS Certificates

​nats-jwt-setup Execution Order

​Troubleshooting

​Agent Cannot Connect to NATS

​JWT Expired / Connection Rejected

​Cross-Account Metrics Not Flowing

​Internal Service Auth Failure

​Related Documents

Overview

Trust Hierarchy

Account Architecture

AGENT Account

CONTROL_PLANE Account

SYS Account

Agent Credential Flow

First Boot: NKey Generation

JWT Request via gRPC

NATS Connection

Credential Persistence

Proactive Renewal

JWT Expiry Behavior

Bootstrap Order

Shutdown

Internal Service Auth

Payment Service

Infrastructure Setup

nats-jwt-setup Tool

NATS Server Configuration

Docker Volumes

Vault Secret Structure

Environment Variables

TLS Configuration

Overview

Port Layout

Certificate Files

Certificate Issuance and Renewal

Deploy Hook

Client Trust

Usage Matrix

NATS Server TLS Config

Certificate Monitoring

Key Rotation

Account Signing Key Rotation

Operator Key Rotation

User JWT Rotation

Key Packages

Operational Notes

JetStream Volume Wipe on Mode Switch

Payment Service Vault Path

Generated Artifacts — Do Not Commit

TLS Certificates

nats-jwt-setup Execution Order

Troubleshooting

Agent Cannot Connect to NATS

JWT Expired / Connection Rejected

Cross-Account Metrics Not Flowing

Internal Service Auth Failure

Related Documents